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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the Supreme
Court under Article VII, Section 3, of the Utah Constitution; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(i); and Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, this being a discretionary appeal from an interlocutory
ruling of the District Court.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the District Court err in failing to include Plaintiff's
employer

on

the

Special

Jury

Verdict

Form

for

purposes of

apportioning its fault with reference to the subject accident?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The

following

statutes

and

rules

are

believed

to

be

determinative of the issue presented above:
UTAH CODE ANN., § 35-1-60 (1990);
UTAH CODE ANN., §§ 78-27-37, et.

seq.

(1990);

Rule 49, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The contents of the above-cited authorities are fully set forth in
the Addendum to this brief, in accord with Rule 24(f), Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceeding
and Disposition in the Lower Court.
Plaintiff, Jodie Dahl, commenced this action, seeking recovery
for personal injuries allegedly sustained when tripping over a
trench cut in the concrete floor at her place of employment, the
Albertsons Distribution Center in North Salt Lake, Utah. Named as
Defendants were
manager

for

the

Epstein

Construction,

project,

and

Kerbs

Inc., the

construction

Construction

Corp.,

a

subcontractor who was directly responsible for cutting the subject
trench.

(Record 1-2).

In addition to denying specific allegations of the Complaint,
the Defendants affirmatively alleged contributory negligence on
Plaintiff's part and also comparative negligence on the part of her
employer, Albertsons.

(R.13-17).

A Cross-Claim was also brought

by Epstein against Kerbs, seeking indemnity and insurance coverage
for any judgment rendered against it in Plaintiff's favor, pursuant
to the terms of the construction contract between those parties.
(R. 103-111).
Facts uncovered during the course of discovery supported the
principle that Albertsons

subjected

its employees to hazards

associated with the construction work by having them perform tasks
in the area of on-going construction. As a result of this evidence
of comparative negligence, Epstein filed a Motion to Include
2

Albertsons on the special verdict form.

(R. 565).

Shortly

thereafter, Defendant Kerbs joined in such motion, which was
initially granted by District Judge Cornaby.

(R. 701). However,

upon a review of the issue in the context of Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration, Judge Cornaby reversed his earlier determination
and refused to permit the negligence of Albertsons to be assessed
(R. 749-750).

by the jury.

Following Judge Cornabyfs refusal to certify the decision as
a final judgment, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 54(b), Epstein
and Kerbs sought review through a Petition for Interlocutory
Appeal, which was granted by Order of the Supreme Court on November
12, 1991.

Due to the importance of the issue to be resolved

through this appeal, trial of the District Court case, originally
set for December 12, 1991, has been stayed on motion of the
Defendants.

(R. 978-979 and 982-983).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

During the month of February, 1989, and periods prior thereto,
Epstein Construction acted as a construction manager with respect
to a remodelling project at Albertsons' North Salt Lake City
Distribution Center.

Among the remodelling work to be performed

under the parties' contract was the installation of new banana
storage rooms.

(R. 265).

Epstein let a subcontract to Kerbs

Construction under which they saw-cut a trench in the concrete
3

floor of the Distribution Center for purposes of placing utility
lines and the banana room walls.

(R. 266).

While construction was being performed and after the trench
had been cut, Albertsons continued to require employees to perform
tasks

in

vicinity.

the

area

immediately

adjacent

to

the

construction

In the course of a day, employees would regularly

traverse the floor slot.

(R. 522). The decision to place workers

in the potentially hazardous construction area was made by Frank
Payan, Albertsons' warehouse manager.

(R. 524). In fact, so as to

allow employees to work in the construction area, Albertsons
specifically precluded

the contractors

from taking protective

measures, including to barricade the subject trench.

(R. 588).

Even workers' complaints as to the hazards associated with working
in the area were ignored by the employer. Plaintiff testified that
her supervisor responded to a complaint by stating "You guys quit
your bitching and get your asses over there and get to work."

(R.

883).
On February 14, 1989, Plaintiff fell backward over the trench,
suffering

the

injuries

complained

of

in

these

proceedings.

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the accident, she suffered a
herniated disk and other physical complications.

(R. 2). It is

undisputed that Plaintiff received workers compensation benefits
for her injuries.

(R. 3).
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The District Court found the legal position of the Plaintiff
"appears more reasonable" and, hence, excluded Albertsons, her
employer, from the special verdict form.

Contrary to the Court's

ruling, such is neither the majority rule nor better reasoned law.
Rather, it is violative of the sound equitable principle of holding
a defendant accountable for only its proportionate share of fault,
particularly as expressed in Utah comparative negligence statutes.
The District Judge's ruling was erroneous and Albertsons must be
included on the special verdict form to reach a well-considered
judgment in this action.
ARGUMENT
Introduction
Undisputed evidence in our case indicates Albertsons
knowingly exposed employees to a potentially dangerous condition,
resulting from remodeling work being performed at its Distribution
Warehouse and refused to permit the contractors to take preventive
measures.

Despite workers' complaints, Albertsons supervisors

ordered Jodie Dahl to perform work tasks immediately adjacent to an
uncovered cut in the concrete floor.
Plaintiff's

allegations, working

Accepting the truth of

in this area caused

her to

accidently trip and fall over the slot, sustaining the complained
of injuries.

Hence, this is not an instance where the Defendants
5

are merely trying to cloud the issue of their negligence. Instead,
there is substantial evidence of fault here on the employer's part
making this an appropriate case to address the issue. Nonetheless,
due to the Court's ruling on the motion to include Albertsons on
the jury verdict form, Defendants/Appellants Epstein and Kerbs face
possible

liability

for

a

judgment

far

in

excess

of

their

proportionate degree of fault. This is a result incompatible with
Utah's

comparative

negligence

scheme

and

sound

policy

considerations as well.
As a case of first impression in the appellate system, the
Supreme Court should review this matter and find that an employer's
negligence can be determined by the trier-of-fact when entering a
judgment in proceedings such as these.
A. Utah's Comparative Negligence
Statute Mandates the Inclusion of
An Employer on a Special Verdict Form
There is little question that an employer owes employees a
duty to provide a reasonably safe and hazard-free workplace.
Godesky v. Provo City Corp.r 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984).
likewise

little

aforementioned
negligence.

doubt

duty,

that

and,

an

hence,

employer
be

held

may

There is

breach

the

accountable

for

However, in order to strike a balance in favor of

compensating employees for work-related injuries, the Legislature
has granted employers immunity from negligence actions, so long as
6

the employer has complied with obligations imposed under the Utah
Worker's Compensation Act, codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-60.
Immunity granted under the Worker's Compensation Act has been
extended to claims of contribution and implied indemnity in thirdparty actions brought by non-employer defendants when sued by the
injured employee.

See, generally, Freund v» Utah Power & Light

Co. f 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990).

The important question raised by

this appeal is whether the employers' immunity and consequential
non-joinder as a party tort-feasor precludes an apportionment of
their fault under Utah's comparative negligence scheme and special
verdict

provisions.

It

is

respectfully

urged

that

such

apportionment is not contrary to the Worker's Compensation Act, but
is mandated and entirely consistent with tort reform principles
adopted in Utah.
The sound underlying principle of comparative negligence in
Utah is announced in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40, which provides:
Subject to § 78-27-38, the maximum amount for
which a defendant may be liable to any person
seeking recovery is that percentage or
proportion of the damages equivalent to the
percentage or proportion of fault attributed
to that defendant. No defendant is entitled
to contribution from any other person.
Furthermore, § 78-27-38 states ". . .No defendant is liable to any
person

seeking

recovery

for

any

amount

in

excess

proportionate of fault attributable to that defendant."
7

of

the

In order

to determine a defendant's 'proportion of fault', the Act relies on
the

use

of

special

verdicts

which

find

"the

percentage

or

proportion of fault attributable to each person seeking relief and
to each defendant".

§ 78-27-39 (Emphasis added).

Based on the special verdict

statute, Respondent argued

successfully in the District Court that because Albertsons, the
employer, cannot be made a party-defendant, it likewise cannot be
placed on the special verdict form for purposes of determining its
percentage of fault.

This proposition is contrary to Utah law and

a majority of other jurisdictions.
While not passing on the precise issue presented here, the
Utah Supreme Court has, on a number of occasions, allowed the
jury's consideration of a non-party's negligence. For instance, in
Godesky v, Provo City Corpt, supra, the court let stand, without
express comment, the jury finding that the employer was negligent
and

proportionately

responsible

for

causing

the

accident.

Similarly, in Bishop v. Neilsenf 632 P.2d 864 (Utah 1981), the
court permitted contribution against an arguably immune party,
finding it a "joint tort-feasor".

Also instructive is the case of

Madsen v. Salt Lake City School Board, 645 P.2d 658, 663 (Utah
1982), where this court stated:
It
is
imperative
that
the
issue
of
proportionate fault should be litigated
between all joint tort-feasors in the same
8

action and resolved by the same trier of the
issues of fact.
This was despite the fact the joint tort-feasor was an immune
governmental entity.
The import of the foregoing authority is that regardless of
possible immunity, defendants joined in the action are entitled to
a determination of a joint tort-feasor's fault so that partydefendants are only liable for their percentage of negligence.1
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not directly ruled on this
issue in the context of an employer, the clear weight of authority
from

other

jurisdictions

has

extended

general

comparative

negligence principles to entities situated as Albertsons.
One of the first cases addressing the issue of apportioning an
immune employer's negligence on a jury verdict form is Connar Vt
West Shore Equipment of Milwaukee. Inc.. 227 N.W. 2d 660, 662
(Wisconsin 1975).
It is established without doubt that, when
apportioning negligence, a jury must have the
opportunity to consider the negligence of all
parties to the transaction, whether or not
x

This is a position which has been adopted by the Utah
Attorney General's office. In response to an inquiry from Federal
Magistrate Calvin Gould, in the context of a case entitled Yantes
v. Signode Corp.r Civil No. 89 NC 0055-S, the Attorney Generalfs
office stated "the immunity of an employer is in no way impaired by
being joined for the purposes of apportioning fault."
Sfifi,
Appendix B hereto. It is also the opinion adopted by numerous
federal and state district court judges from Utah. £££ various
orders and ruling gathered at Appendix B.
9

they be parties to the lawsuit and whether or
not they can be liable to the Plaintiff or to
the other tort-feasors, either by operation of
law or because of a prior release.
Referring to this Wisconsin rule as being "clearly the prevalent
practice among state courts", the Idaho Supreme Court, in Pocatello
Industrial Park Co. v. Steel Westr Inc.r 621 P.2d 399, 403 (Idaho
1980), construed a comparative negligence special verdict statute
almost identical to Utah's:
The court may, and when requested by any
party, shall, direct the jury to find separate
special verdicts determining the amount of
damages and the percentage of negligence
attributable to each party . . . I.C. §6-802.
Acknowledging that the employer could not be made a "party" to the
proceedings, the court, nonetheless, held its negligence should be
apportioned by the jury.
While the statute requires the parties be
included in the special verdict, it does not
state that only parties shall be included.
661 P.2d. 403.2
Among other states which have allowed an apportionment of
fault, in the context of comparative negligence of an otherwise
immune entity or non-party are: Wyoming, Kirby Building Systems v..
Mineral

Explorationsr

704 P.2d

2

1266,

1272

(Wyo.

1985)

("The

At least one commentator has noted that the Utah comparative
negligence statute is almost identical to the Idaho Act construed
in Pocatello Industrial Park. £fi£, Thode, Comparative
Negligence,
Contribution
Among Tort-Feasors
and the Effect
of a Release - a
Triple Play by the Utah Legislature,
1973 UTAH L. REV. 406 (1973).
10

requirement that all participants' fault be ascertained means that
the fault of non-party actors, as well as party tort-feasors, must
be calculated by the fact finder."); Kansas, Brown v. Keillr 580
P.2d 867 (Kan. 1978); Indiana, Huber v. Henley, 656 F. Supp. 508
(S.D.

Ind. 1987) (Immune governmental entities' fault must be

apportioned

by

jury

under

Indiana's

comparative

negligence

statutes); North Carolina, Leonard v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp..
305 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1983); Illinois, Hall v. Archer-DanielsMidland Co.r 491 N.E.2d 879 (111. App. 1986); and, New Mexico,
Tavlor v. Delgarno Transportation, Inc.f 667 P.2d 445 (N.M. 1983).
The more recent trend of apportioning the negligence of an
immune employer in a third-party action instituted by an employee
was expressly adopted by California courts in Mills v. MMM Carpets,
Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813 (Cal. App. 6th 1991).

There, a bank

employee sought recovery for personal injuries from a building
manager

and owner

and

a carpet

installer.

The court held

apportionment of the employer's negligence did not run afoul of the
employer's general immunity from tort liability.

JA. at 818. In

construing the statute (CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (A)) which read,
quite like Utah's,
Each defendant shall be liable only for the
amount of non-economic damages allocated to
that defendant in direct proportion to that
defendant's percentage of fault.

11

the court held the equation

"does not vary according to the

presence or absence as parties of other tort-feasors in a given
case . . . . It instead most readily suggests comparison with the
fault of the entire field of tort-feasors."

1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at

816-817.
Although

contribution

against

an

employer

was

commonly

rejected prior to passage of pure comparative negligence laws, most
states still permit an allocation of the employer's fault.
instance,

in the recent

For

case of Williams v. White Mountain

Construction Co.r 749 P.2d 423, 429 (Colo. 1988), the Colorado
Supreme Court disallowed contribution, yet held:
Tort-feasors sued by injured employees are now
able to present evidence of employer liability
at trial, so as to reduce whatever damages may
be assessed
against
them
to a level
proportionate to their liability.
In ClarK V, PacifiCQrp, 809 P.2d 176 (Wash. 1991), the appeal
of a state court action and a question certified from the federal
court were consolidated.

At issue was RCW 4.22.070(1), which

provided:
In all actions involving fault of more than
entity, the trier of fact shall determine the
percentage of the total fault which is
attributable to every entity which caused the
claimant's damages, including the claimant
...
third-party
defendants . . . [and]
entities immune from liability.

12

In the primary case, Clark had filed a wrongful death action
against Pacificorp, who had hired the decedent's employer to trim
trees away from power lines.

Under the Washington Worker's

Compensation Act, the employer was immune from liability and could
not be named as a party to the action.
determination

of

the

employer's

corresponding reduction of damages.

Pacificorp sought a

comparative

negligence

and

Under those circumstances,

identical to ours, the court held:
A trier of fact shall apportion fault to all
at-fault entities in accordance with RCW
4.22.070. This includes the injured worker or
beneficiary, the employer and the third-party.
Each party shall then pay his proportionate
share of damages.
Id. at 179.

(Emphasis added).

Cf. Glass v. Stahl Specialty Co.,

652 P.2d 948, 953 (Wash. 1982) (Contribution claim against employer
barred prior to enactment of the comparative negligence statute
"even though requiring one wrong-doer to shoulder all the damages
when the other wrong-doer is an employer may be unfair . . . " ) .
The Utah special verdict statute can be construed to exclude
consideration of an employer's negligence, arguably applying only
to "each person seeking recovery and to each defendant". UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-27-39.

But, as the Idaho court found in Pocatello

Industrial Park, the statute "does not state that only parties
shall be included".

621 P.2d 403.

13

Furthermore, the key phrase

"person

seeking

recovery"

in the special verdict

statute is

sufficiently broad to encompass employers.
Per UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(3),

"persons seeking recovery"

are those "seeking damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or
on behalf on another for whom it is authorized to act as legal
representative".

(Emphasis added.)

Under the Utah Workerf s

Compensation Act, an employer is the "trustee of the cause of
action against the third party" and may maintain an action on its
own behalf or in the name of the injured employee.
§ 35-1-62.

UTAH CODE ANN.

The statute goes on to provide that the employer will

be reimbursed for compensation payments even before an injured
employee recovers.

As such, the employer is a person seeking

recovery under § 78-27-39, who should be included on the special
verdict f >rm.
B. Considerations of Equity and
Fairness Require an Employer's
Negligence to Be Apportioned.
One of the acknowledged purposes of comparative negligence is
to ameliorate the harsh consequences of traditional contributory
negligence and joint and several liability among defendants. See,
generally, Jansen v. Intermountain Health Carer Inc.. 679 P.2d 903
(Utah

1984).

Appellants

Epstein

and

Kerbs

face

a

strong

possibility that if Albertsons1 degree of fault is not taken into
account by the jury, they will be liable for a disproportionate
14

percentage

of

responsibility

as

appropriate means of remedying

joint

tort-feasors•

this unheralded

result

The
is to

overrule Judge Cornaby's decision.
Recognition

of

the

salutary

purpose

expressed

above is

essential in construing the special verdict statute. See, Mills Vt
MMM Carpetsf

supra.

As in Mills, the result here sought by

Plaintiff and "adopted by the trial court would re-write the
statute to provide that the Defendants' percentage of fault was to
be measured in relation to the fault of only other Defendants in
the action. The statutory language does not invoke such a limited
comparison."

1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 817.

In the Kansas case of Brown v. Keill. supra, the court
addressed the argument that apportioning a non-parties' negligence
would be unfair to a plaintiff.

The argument was rejected, in

part, realizing that by enacting comparative negligence statutes,
legislatures had relieved plaintiffs of the potentially harsh allor-nothing

recovery

notions

which

result

from

contributory

negligence rules. In essence, the burden and potential unfairness
of contesting a non-party's responsibility is offset by eliminating
the risk of non-recovery existing under contributory negligence.
The court went on to acknowledge "the law governing tort liability
will never be a panacea."

Id. at 874.

With this in mind, the

legislature's intent in adopting comparative negligence was to
15

relay duty to pay to the degree of fault•
Health Care, Inct, supra.

Jensen v. Intermountain

The only means of fulfilling this

purpose in our circumstances is to permit a jury to determine the
employer's fault, through the special verdict, which will leave
Appellants Epstein and Kerbs responsible for only their respective
percentages of fault.
Even

prior

principles,

to

courts

adoption
expressed

of

pure

concern

comparative
and

railed

negligence
against

the

inequity of denying a defendant, such as Epstein, the right to
plead or prove an employer's concurrent negligence in an action
brought

by an injured

employee.

In an effort

to strike a

compromise between the competing interests of employer immunity,
compensating an injured employee and yet permitting defendants,
such as Epstein, a sort of quasi-contribution, courts devised a
number of mechanisms.

For instance, in Baccile v. Halcyon Lines,

187 F.2d 403 (3rd Cir. 1951), reversed on other grounds, Halcyon
Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp. , 342 U.S. 282 (1952),
the court limited contribution against an employer to that sum
which it had been liable to pay the employee through worker's
compensation.
Another method a number of courts employed

was that of

reducing the injured employee's recovery by sums received through
the worker's compensation claim. 3fi£, generally, Murray Vt United
16

States, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. App. 1968). Pennsylvania, by contrast,
limited the same to the amount of the employer's liability under
the Workers Compensation Act216 A.2d 318 (Pa. 1966).

Elston v. Industrial Lift Truck Co.,

The New York Court of Appeals in Pole v«

Dow Chemical Co.f 282 N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972), allowed indemnity
over against a negligent employer in an amount proportionate to its
share of fault.

This approach was similarly adopted in Skinner v.

Reed-Prentice Package Machinery Co.. 374 N.E.2d 437 (111. 1977).
Fortunately, Utah's comparative negligence statutes do away
with the need to adopt a flawed result-oriented analysis to achieve
a fair allocation of the various parties' responsibility for an
employee's injuries.

A trial judge may place the issue of an

employer's fault before the jury on the special verdict form and,
thereby, arrive at a recovery corresponding to each particular
defendant's

degree of

fault.

Interests of compensating

the

employee and maintaining the employer's immunity are preserved
inviolate.
There

is

another

sound

policy

consideration

apportionment of the employer's negligence, to wit:
double recovery by the employee.

supporting
preventing a

Through a plaintiff's worker's

compensation benefits, an employee is reimbursed for most if not
all economic losses associated with the injury, for instance, lost
wages and medical expenses.

Without question in the employee's
17

third-party action, he may once again recover the same damages,
subject only to an employer's or the insurance fund's rights of
subrogation.

Thus, there is a very real risk of a prohibited

double recovery.
It may be argued, however, that by apportioning an employer's
negligence, these subrogation rights are unfairly prejudiced. The
proposition is fallacious, because as an elementary subrogation
principle, a subrogee must not himself be at fault or contributing
to the loss on which he sues.

A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION,

§ 75.23 (1990).
It is clear that allocating an employer's fault in a thirdparty suit brought by an injured employee is supported by the sound
policy considerations behind Utah's comparative negligence scheme.
Specifically, no single tort-feasor should be responsible for a
disproportionate share of liability. Nor does apportionment unduly
prejudice the Plaintiff or impair subrogation rights. Albertsons,
Jodie Dahl's employer, should be included on the Special Jury
Verdict Form in order to reach a just result in our case. The only
means of doing so is to overrule District Judge Cornaby's ruling.
CONCLUSION
Based

upon

the

foregoing,

the

district

court

erred

in

excluding Plaintiff's employer, Albertsons, from the special jury
verdict form for purposes of apportioning its fault with respect to
18

the subject accident.

Such is contrary to Utah's Comparative

Negligence scheme and sound policy considerations as well.
Respectfully submitted this

< p o — day of January, 1992.

Michael A. Katz
<C_
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT, P.C.
39 Post Office Place, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2104
Attorneys for Appellant, Epstein
Construction, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

M®

day of January, 1992, I

caused four true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT
EPSTEIN CONSTRUCTION'S BRIEF to be served upon the following by
placing copies thereof in the United States mails, postage prepaid,
addressed as follows:

Nelson L. Hayes
George T. Naegle
Richards, Brandt, Miller
& Nelson
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465
James B. Hasenyager
Marquardt, Hasenyager & Custen
2661 Washington Blvd., #202
Ogden, UT 84401

C3

ADDENDUM

STATUTES

35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer,
agent or employee — Occupational disease excepted.
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for
injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities of
the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such employee or to his
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of any
accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or
incurred by such employee in the course of or because of or arising out of his
employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury or death of an employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall
prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the industrial commission of Utah for compensation in those cases within the provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as amended.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 76; C.L. 1917,
§ 3132; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 42-1-57; L. 1949, ch. 52, § 1.
Cross-References. — Employment of children, § 34-23-1 et seq.

78-27-37-

Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law,
§ 35-2-1 et seq.
Meaning of "this act". — See the note under the same catchiine following § 35-1-46.
5

Definitions.

As used in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit who is
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission
proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a
person seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in all
its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability,
breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability, and
misuse, modification or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking damages or
reimbursement on its own behalf, of on behalf of another for whom it is
authorized to act as legal representative.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-37, enacted by L. acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 1, relating to
1986, ch. 199, § 1.
dimtnishment of damages and assumption of
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, risk, and rcenacts the above section,
ch. 1989, § 1 repeals former § 78-27-37, as en-

78-27-38.

Comparative negligence.

oJin^R11 °f a

P e r S n Se eldng recover
°
rf r m 3 n y e f3e'nsdhaII
rGC0V
an

not aione bar recovery by that
u
°
^
t or group of defendant whose
fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person seeking
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thatVdefen°dr T

^

^ *" ^
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History: C. 1953, 78-27-38, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 2.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 2 repeals former § 78-27-38, as enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 2, relating to
special verdicts, and reenacts the above section.

Pr P rti n

° °

° ° f f a u ^ a t t r i b u t e tf

Cross-References. — Product Liability Act
manufacturer or seller not liable if alteration
or modification of product after sale ia substantial contributing cause of injury, § 78-15-5.
Skiers not to make claim against or recover
from ski area operator for injury resulting from
any inherent risk of skiing, § 78-27-53.

78-27-39, Separate special verdicts on total damages and
proportion of fault.
The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury,
if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each
person seeking recovery and to each defendant.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-39, enacted by L. acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 3, relating to
1986, ch. 199, § 3.
con&ibution among joint tortfeasors, and reenRepeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, *acts* the above section.
ch. 199, § 3 repeals former § 78-27-39, as en-

78-27-40- Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault
— No contribution.
Subject to § 78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a defendant may be
liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the
damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that
defendant. No defendant is entitled to contribution from any other person.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-40, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, S 4.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 4 repeals former § 78-27-40, as enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 4, relating to

settlement by a joint tortfeasor, and reenacts
the above section.
Cross-References. — Enforcement of contribution and reimbursement, Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 69(h).
Joint obligations, § 15-4-1 et seq.

78-27-41. J o i n d e r o f d e f e n d a n t s .
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the litigation,
may join as parties any defendants who may have caused or contributed to the
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the purpose of having
determined their respective proportions of fault.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-41, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 5.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 5 repeals former § 78-27-41, as en-

acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 5, relating to
rights of contribution and indemnity, and reenacts the above section,

78-27-42, Release to one defendant does not discharge
other defendants.
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does
not discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-42, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 199, § 6.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 6 repeals former § 78-27-42, as en-

acted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 6, relating to
release of joint tortfeasors and a reduction of
claim, and reenacts the above section,

78-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indemnity, contribution.
Nothing in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any common
law or statutory immunity from liability, including, but not limitecLto, governmental immunity as provided in Chapter 30, Title 63, and the exclusive
remedy provisions of Chapter 1, Title 35. Nothing in §§ 78-27-37 through
78-27-42 affects or impairs any right to indemnity or contribution arising
from statute, contract, or agreement.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-43, enacted by L. m 19?, § 9 provided: "If any provision of
1986, ch. 199, § 7.
* §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43, or the applicaRepeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1986, tion of any provisions of those sections to any
ch. 199, § 7 repeals former § 78-27-43, as en- person or circumstance, is held invalid, the reacted by Laws 1973, ch. 209, § 7, relating to m a ining provisions of those sections shall be
release of joint tortfeasors and contribution, g i v c n e f f e c t w i t h o u t ^e i n v a H d p r o v i s i o n o r
and reenacts the above section.
application "
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1986, ch.

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 49. Special verdicts and interrogatories.
(a) Special verdicts. The court may require a jury to return only a special
verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that
event the court may submit to the jury written interrogatories susceptible of
categorical or other brief answer or may submit written forms of the several
special findings which might properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or it may use such other method of submitting the issues and requiring
the written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court shall
give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter thus
submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon
each issue. If iri so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the
pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury of
the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its submission
to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may make a
finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in
accord with the judgment on the special verdict.
(b) General verdict accompanied by answer to interrogatories. The
court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general
verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of
which is necessary to a verdict. The court shall give such explanation or
instruction as may be necessary to enable the jury both to make answers to
the interrogatories and to render a general verdict, and the court shall direct
the jury both to make written answers and to render a general verdict. When
the general verdict and the answers are harmonious, the appropriate judgment upon the verdict and answers shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A.
When the answers are consistent with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule 58A
in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or the
court may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict
or may order a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent with each other
and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment
shall not be entered, but the court shall return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or shall order a new trial.

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO
IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

JODIE DAHL,
Plaintiff,
vs.

RULING ON MOTION
TO EXCLUDE ALBERTSONS
Civil No, 900746945

KERBS CONSTRUCTION, et al.,
Defendants.

The plaintiff has moved to exclude Albertsons from the
special verdict form. The defendants oppose the motion.
On February 26, 1991, Epstein Construction moved the Court
to include Albertsons on the special verdict form. On March 13,
1991, Kerbs Construction Company joined in that motion. On
March 13, 1991, the Court received Epstein's notice to submit
for decision. The motion was supported by a brief that was well
reasoned and supported by law from both Idaho and Wisconsin.
Since the plaintiff apparently was not objecting the Court
granted the motion.
The rule of law involved has not been adjudicated in Utah.
Albertsons is not a party to the action and cannot be made one
because of the Workman's Compensation law.
Apparently, the
majority of jurisdictions would exclude Albertsons from the
special verdict form because it is not a party and cannot be
made a party. On the other hand, Idaho and Wisconsin rule that
the fault of all persons contributing to an accident should "be
presented to the jury under comparative negligence law.
The plaintiff was not diligent in responding to defendants'
motion to include Albertsons. Yet, the legal position of the
plaintiff appears more reasonable to the Court. The defendants

point out that there is no such thing as a motion for
reconsideration in Utah- This rule works well when the Court
has made factual findings, but not so well when, as here, no one
is hurt by the application of the better reasoned lawIn spite of the Court's prior ruling, it now rules that
Albertsons shall be excluded from the special jury verdict.
Regardless of the outcome of the case, the plaintiff's attorney
is responsible for defendants' attorney fees in conjunction with
responding to the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.
The plaintiff is directed to file a formal order with the
Court.
Dated June 27, 1991.
BY THE COURT:
/

Y^L ,
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Certificate of Mailing:

This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to:
James R. Hasenyager
2661 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401

Suite 202

J. Nick Crawford
3rd Floor
39 Post Office Place
SLC, UT 84101-2104

Gary D. Stott
George T. Naegle
P. 0. Box 2465
SLC, UT 84110-2465
Dated this

day of June

1991,

Deputy Ql^rk

Honorable Calvin Gould
United States Courthouse
350 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:

Yantes v. Signode Corporation, et al., Civil No.
89 NC-0055-S

Dear Magistrate Gould:
The question of constitutionality of the exclusive
remedy provision of Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-60, and of the
comparative negligence provision which preserves statutory
immunities, Utah Code Ann. 5 78-27-43, has been certified to the
Utah Attorney General. The purpose of this letter is to respond
to your December 20, 1989 inquiry to Assistant Attorney General
Stephen Sorenson as to whether this office will take action in
support of the statutes.
It appears that a constitutional challenge would arise
only if the exclusive remedy provision prevented the joining of
an employer for apportionment of fault•
Since the exclusive remedy provision, Utah Code Ann. §
35-1-60, accomplishes its purpose by providing that "no action at
law (i.e., action for money damages) may be maintained against
an employer, there is no conflict with joining an employer solely
to apportion fault, a proceeding which cannot impose a money
judgment: on the employer. Therefore, there being no statutory
language giving an employer immunity from suit but only immunity
from money damages, the immunity of an employer is in no way
impaired by being joined for the purpose of apportioning fault.
The foregoing statutes not being inconsistent on their
face nor in their purpose or application, this office believes an
issue as to their constitutionality will not be presented. No
steps will therefore be taken by the Attorney General to
intervene in this action at this time.

Honorable Calvin Gould
January 12, 1990
Page Two
Thank you for your courtesies in allowing us time to
assess the need for formal participation by our office.
Your/

veir^trjlly,

Assistant Attorney General
Litigation Division
JRS/sh
cc:

R o b e r t S.
S t e v e n G.
George T.
310 South
S a l t Lake

Campbell, Esq.
F o r s y t h , Esq,
Waddoups, Esq.
Main S t r e e t , S u i t e 1200
C i t y , Utah 84101

Gary B. Ferguson, Esq.
Gary L. Johnson, Esq.
50 South Main, Suite 700
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84144
P h i l i p S. Ferguson, Esq.
175 South West Temple, S u i t e 510
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101
w. 9 r e n t Wilcox, Esq.
136 South Main S t r e e t
500 Kearns Building
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101
Roger P. Baron, Esq.
45 North F i r s t East
Brigham C i t y , Utah 84302
Stephen J .
Assistant
236 S t a t e
S a l t Lake

Sorenson, Esq.
Attorney General
Capitol
C i t y , Utah 84114
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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ?fitf^ftE^I§TRICT OF UTAH
NORTHERN DIVISION
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

BETTY THOMPSON,
Plaintiff(s),
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

vs.
THE CANTEEN, aka CANTEEN CORPORATION, a Delaware c o r p o r ation,

Civil No-

Defendant(s).

90-NC-0068-S

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

This matter is before the court on defendants objection to
the order of the magistrate denying the Canteen's Motion to Compare
Fault of Thiokol Corporation,

Defendant, the Canteen, operated a

restaurant at the Thiokol facility at all times relevant to this
lawsuit.

Plaintiff,

Betty

Thompson,

an

employee

of Thiokol,

slipped and fell in the Canteen severely injuring her hip.

She

then sued the Canteen.

The Canteen has requested that this court allow a special
verdict form which will require the jury to apportion fault, not
only

among

the parties, but also the non-party Thiokol.

The

\

magistrate concluded that such apportionment is not permitted by
Utah law and entered an Order to that effect.

The Canteen objected to both the order and its designation as
an "Order" suggesting that it ought to have been styled a Report &
Recommendation

(R&R)•

This court cannot conduct a de novo review

of an order, but is limited by the "clearly erroneous or contrary
to law" standard of review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).

An R&R, on the

other hand, is subject to a de novo review when a party files an
objection as provided by Rule 72.

This

court

concludes that the magistrate

was

correct

in

designating the'decision an "Order." The rules provide that an R&R
can only be entered on dispositive matters such as motions to
dismiss or motions for summary judgment.
(A) (1982).
catugory

28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1)

A motion to compare fault does not fall within that

of dispositive motions.

Accordingly,

this court has

conducted the review permitted by the Federal Rules and finds the
magistrate's order to be clearly erroneous and contrary to law.

The plaintiff, Ms. Thompson, argued to the magistrate that the
fault of the employer Thiokol should not be apportioned based on
the language of Utah Code Annotated section 78-27-39 which states:
The trial court may, and when requested by any party
shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate special

verdicts determining the total amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person seeking recovery and to each
defendant*
Ms* Thompson takes the position that the language permits apportionment only among defendants in the action*

Ms. Thompson finds

support for this position in Judge Minderfs decision in Smith v.
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., No. C-88-497W (D. Utah
June 2, 1989).

This court concludes that Ms. Thompson's position requires too
restrictive a reading of the Utah statute.
the

statute

expressly

permits

While the language of

proportioning

fault among

the

parties, nothing in the statute prohibits a jury from allocating a
percentage of fault to a non-party.

The magistrate's order also

permits a result which runs contrary to Utah Code Annotated section
78-27-38 ("no defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery
for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to
that defendant") and Utah Code Annotated section 78-27-40

("The

maximum amount for which a defendant may be liable to any person
seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion on the damages
equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed to
that defendant.").

3

Although the Utah Supreme Court has not directly resolved this
issue, two lower courts have done so and it is this courtfs view
that the decisions of those courts are indicative of the interpretation the Utah Supreme Court would give Utah Code Annotated
section 78-27-39. In Fillmore v. Santa Fe Equipment Co., No. C876488, slip. op. at 2 (3rd Dist. Ct. Utah May 9, 1990), Judge Young
granted defendant's motion to apportion fault. According to Judge
Young, "the court finds that the Liability Reform Act was intended
by the legislature to limit a tortfeasor's liability to his
proportionate share of fault as found by the finder of fact and
that the fault of all tortfeasors, including the employer's, must
be apportioned to accomplish this result."

Judge Draney of the

Eighth District Court reached the same conclusion in Lindsev vVovles Transportation Co.. No. 89 CV 134D (8th Dist* Ct. Utah April
11, 1990).

See also Thompson v. Timpanoaos Metals. No. 89-C-0492A

(D. Utah May 10, 1990) .

4

In l i g h t of the conclusions reached by Utah courts on i s s u e s
i d e n t i c a l t o the one at bar, the court r e c o n s i d e r s the m a g i s t r a t e ' s
order and g r a n t s the Canteen's motion t o compare f a u l t of Thiokol.

DATED t h i s

J /^/*day of W^-^-n

. 19 9/..

BY THE COURT:

DAVID SAM
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUTU Uk Ul.UAa~€OONTY
iA'sWjd. CLEn<<

PA
BY

STATE OF UTAH

DEPL

ELIAS VERDUZCO,

Plaintiff,

RULING

vs.
NAT ZONAL SUPPLY COMPANY, INC.

for:rnerly a d i v i s i o n of Armco
Ste e l Corporation, CHASE
DRI LLING COMPANY, a subsidiary
o f KOCH INDUSTRIES, and KOCH
EX? LORATION COMPANY,

Defendants.

C i v i l No. 8 9-CV-117U

Based on the motion of Defendant National Supply Company,
I n c . t o add t h i r d - p a r t y defendant, and good cause appearing,

it

i s hereby ordered that the t r i e r of fact i n t h i s matter w i l l be
a l l c v e d to c o n s i d e r anv a l l s e e d r.eclicence of

Plaintiff's

;ver —n arrz.vmc an atccrt—cnment cz zz.'
DATED t h i s <$3£2-day of February, 1990.
3Y THE COURT:

T
cc:

Glenn C. Hanni
Robert M. McRae
Roger ?. Christensen

GARY B . FERGUSON [A1062]
JOHN c. MCKINLEY CASSIS]
RICHARDS,.. BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
^
A t t o r n e y s f o r Third-Party Defendant
_ m
G r a a o l l C o n s t r u c t i o n Company
RECu'*'1''^-3
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
'
SO S o u t h Main S t r e e t
P . O . Box 2465
MAY 3 1SS0
S a l t Lake C i t v , Utah 84110
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 531-1777
*.-.
.
ALCCM J. A u J i r t i C N

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT Or UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

MICHAEL THOMPSON,
Plaintiff,

/
/
/
/

vs.

/
/

TIMPANOGCS METALS, a Utah
C c r - = c r a t i c n ; UNITED S TATES
CF AMERICA AND ITS AG ENTS;
^ ^?C ** T
UNITED STATES ARMY cc
ENGINEERS, and DOES I <i,
XVI CORPORATIONS I-X,

/
/
/
/
/
/

Defendants.

/
/
/
' /

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

/
/

T h i r d - P a r t y Plaintiff ,/
/
/
vs.
/
GRAMOLL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
/
a n d TIMPANOGCS METALS , I N C . ,
/
/
T h i r d - P a r t y Defendants/

ORDER DISMISSING
GRAMOLL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY

C i v i l No.

33-C-:432A

The t h i r d - p a r t y defendant Gramoll Construction
Company's Motion to Dismiss and the Court's review of the
p a r t i e s 1 attempt to dismiss by s t i p u l a t i o n Gramoll
C o n s t r u c t i o n Company, came on for hearing pursuant to proper
n o t i c e , before the Eonorable Aldon J* Anderson, United S t a t e s
D i s t r i c t Court Judge, on April 23, 1990 at the hour of 11:30
a.m.

The p l a i n t i f f was represented by John Call; the

t h i r d - p a r t y defendant Timpancgos Metals, Inc. was represented
by Robert Henderson; the United S t a t e s of America was
r e p r e s e n t e d by Stephen Sorenson; and Gramoll Construction
Company was represented by Gary B. Ferguson and John C.
McKinley.
After hearing o r a l argument, and reviewing the
p l e a d i n g s on f i l e , the Court ordered as follows:
1.

Gramoll Construction Companyfs Motion to

Dismiss i s granted, thereby dismissing i t , with
prejudice,
2.

The finder of f a c t w i l l be allowed zo

apportion the f a u l t or negligence, i f any, of
Gramoll Construction Company which negligence or
f a u l t may have proximately caused the i n j u r i e s
sustained by the p l a i n t i f f and for which he i s
seeking damages in t h i s a c t i o n .

Any f a u l t or

negligence apportioned t o Gramoll Construction
Company by the f i n d e r of f a c t w i l l r e s u l t in a
prorata reduction of t o t a l damages equal to the

2

percentage of negligence or fault attributed to
Gramoll Construction Company times the total
damages awarded by the finder of fact against all
defendants.
3.

No costs are awarded Gramoll Construction

Company.
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ordered and
decreed that judgment be entered in favor of Gramoll
Construction Company, for no cause of action on the Third-Party
Complaint, and that Gramoll Construction Company and the
third-party plaintiff are to bear their respective costs and
disbursements.

DATED this

/Q

day of

W$/l/f~

1990.

3Y TEZ/COGRT: II

Honorable A2ccr. J. Anderson
United Stages District Court
uzra

MAILING CI?."
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy cf
the foregoing instrument was sailed, first class, postage
prepaid on this ^
day of
, 1990, to the
following counsel of record. Service is aade pursuant to
Rule 13(a)4(c) Civil Rules of Practice of the United States
District Court for the District of Utah.
Julia C. Attvood, Esc.
PARSONS, BEHL2 i LATI2GH
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0893
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Peg

RC3E3T A. BURTON, J0S15
STRONG & iLANNI
A t u c c n e v f f a r Defendant
H e a t h e r Wehnneistar Garrett
S i x t h F l o o r Boston Building
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
Telephone:
(301) 532-7080
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
ANGELA L. 3CGTT,
Plaintiff.
MAGISTRATE'S ORDER
vs.

HEATHER A- WEKRMEISTER.
VOLKSWAGENWESX
AKTIENCESELLSCIIAFT. a foreign
c o r p o r a t i o n , and VOLXSWAGEN OF
AMERICA. I N C . , a New J e r s e y
corporation.

C i v i l No.

87-C-39SS

Defendants.

Defendants* J o i n t Motion for Leave t o F i l e

Third-?arty

Camp 13 i n t r w e : heard on January 11. 1329. a t 3:30 o.m.

rlair.ttff

A n g e l a L. S c o t t was represented by her c o t i n s e i o f record David J .
J o r d a n and J e f f r e y E. Nelson of Van C o t t . B a g l e y . Cornwall s
McCarthy.

Defendant Heather A. Wehrmeister. aka Heather G a r r e t t .

was r e p r e s e n t e d by her counsel of record Robert A- Burton of
S t r o n g & Hanni.
represented

Defendant voikswagen o f America. I n c . was

by i t s counsel of cecocd Shawn E. Draney of Snow,

Che i s t e n s e n £ Martineau.

WLO

The court having reviewed the memoranda

-L-

of the pacties and having aeacd the arguments of counsel and goad
cause appearing thsrefac.
IT IS KEKE3Y QRDE-lED. AOJUOGED AND 0EC3EED as follows:
i.

Defendants at trial ace entitled to raise as an

affirmative defense, pursuant to Utan Cods Annotated §73-27-37 et
seq.

the negligence of the Chi Trieiias- Sorority, its officers

and Bricham Toung University, and defendants acs entitled to have
the negligence and/or fault, if any, of these parties compared on
the special verdict form submitted to the jury.
2.

Defendants zee entitled to file their third-party

complaints but they need not file

nor sacva

the third-pa^ty com-

plaints in ocder to preserve their eight to have the negligence
aevd/oc fault of the Chi tciellas Sococity, its officers and
Dcigham "iouag university compared on the special verdict form,
which wjii he submitted to the jury at trial.
J {

DATED this

day of

* <QtP<s^-.

, 1*89.

BY THE CCU&T:,

4Vk i* « • « * • « • « •

GCs attys 2/10/89 tdp
David J, Jordan, Esq.
Roberr A^ 3urton. Esq*
H. Jams Cleqg, Esq.

Sttawn £ . Dcaney
C a u n s e i / ' f o c Volfcswage/t' oc

RdOecc 1\>* aurcon
C o u n s e l f o r Ilea thee
Wehrmeister

wio-MObc

k.

-2-

NISG

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ANNA G. E. MORRISON,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO.

880900358

vs.
EARL H. BOOTH,
Defendant,

Now
Fault,

before
or

the

Court

alternatively

Complaint.

is defendant's
for

Leave

to

Motion

File

a

to

Compare

Third

Party

The Court has reviewed the Memoranda submitted in

connection with said Motion, and now rules as follows:
The Court is of the opinion that in order to satisfy the
intent

and

purpose

of

the

Tort

Reform

Act

and

related

legislation, that the "fault" of all parties contributing to
the injury must be compared, whether that fault is negligence
or

intentional conduct, or a combination

otherwise

would

defeat

the

purpose

of both.
of

the

To rule
applicable

legislation.
The plaintiff could easily undermine the purpose of this
legislation

by

singling

out

a

single

defendant

who,

for

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE TWO

MORRISON V, BOOTH

example, may have greater resources to satisfy a judgment than
other

defendants,

and

if that

defendant

were

not

able

to

compare the fault of other persons who had contributed to the
injury then he would likely, if he had some fault, end up
paying
share.

a

greater
It

is,

proportion
of

course,

legislation seeks to avoid.

of

the

this

damages

precise

than
thing

his

fair

that

the

It is clear that the legislature

wants defendants to pay only for damages that they themselves
have caused.

The fact that the conduct of some of the other

defendants may have been intentional, is no reason to undermine
the beneficial

purpose of this legislation.

Why would

the

legislature want defendants who are only negligent to run the
risk of having to pay for the intentional conduct of other
defendants while being so careful to insure that they do not
run the risk of paying for the negligent conduct of other
defendants?
In the opinion of the Court, it makes much more sense in
terms of judicial economy, and the savings of time and effort
and attorney,s fees to allow a jury to compare the conduct of
named defendants with the conduct of unnamed defendants who may
have

contributed

defendants

to

to

file

the
third

injury,
party

rather

than

complaints.

requiring
Of

course,

MORRISON V. BOOTH
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plaintiff was always at liberty from the beginning to name all
individuals

as

defendants who

may

have

contributed

to

her

injury.
Accordingly, defendants Motion

to Compare the Fault of

Robert Lee Boog, Jr. and Maren Matkin is granted.

Assuming

that there is some evidence of conduct on the part of these
individuals

that

may

have

contributed

to

the

plaintiff's

injury, then the Court will allow their conduct to be compared
on the Special Verdict form.
Counsel for defendant is to prepare an Order consistent
with this ruling, and submit it in accordance with the Local
Rules of Practice.
Dated t h i s ^ W^-dav of June, 1991.

fe/ frrttALLfiy /Urns {
T R A N K G 7 NOEL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the
this

foregoing Memorandum

Decision,

day of June, 1991:

Frederick N. Green
Attorney for Plaintiff
10 Exchange Place, Suite 528
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Lowell V. Smith
Richard K. Glauser
Attorneys for Defendant
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Stephen L. Henriod
Co-counsel for Defendant
60 E. South Temple, Suite 700-38
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

to the following,

